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NOTE
NEW YORK'S MEGAN'S LAW:
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
DETERMINES THE FATE
© Copyright 1997 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights
Introduction
The New York State legislature recently adopted the Sex
Offender Registration Act (hereinafter "SORA"). ' This Note will focus
on the constitutional challenges that have been made to the New York
law and will consider other constitutional issues raised by opponents of
the law. Many states have similar laws concerning treatment sex
offenders.' While many states require sex offenders to register with
local law enforcement agencies,3 fewer states provide for community
notification.' State and federal courts have split as to whether
I N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996). SORA requires individuals convicted of
certain sex offenses to register with law enforcement officials who are, in turn, authorized
to notify the community of the registrants' whereabouts. Id.
2 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 387-88 n.9 (N.J. 1995). The New Jersey Supreme
Court lists thirty-eight states, excluding New York and New Jersey, that have adopted sex
offender registration statutes. Id.
3 See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-a(4) (McKinney 1996). "A law enforcement
agency havingjurisdidion means the chief law enforcement officer in the village, town, or
city in which the offender expects to reside upon his discharge, probation, parole .... Id.
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registration and notification laws are constitutional.' An analysis of
these state and federal decisions may aid in determining the fate of the
New York law.
Section I of this Note will discuss the circumstances that
prompted the trend towards adopting this legislation.' Section II will
focus on the New York statute and its various provisions in comparison
to New Jersey's statute, known as 'Megan's Law.'7 Many of the
provisions of SORA and Megan's Law are similar.' Section III of this
Note will focus on the debate concerning retroactive application of sex
offender registration and notification statutes. 9 Courts have split on
whether retroactive application constitutes additional punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. ° Section III will also consider the
different tests used by the state and federal courts in reaching their
decisions." Section IV sets forth other constitutional challenges that
4See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 388 n.9. Of the thirty-eightstates cited by the Court that
have enacted sex offender registration acts, twenty states provide for some type of
community notification. Id. The Court also noted "New Jersey's statute is unique in that it
is the only one in which community notification is mandatory rather than up to the discretion
of local officials." Id.
3 See id. at 422 (holding both the registration and the notification provisions of Megan's
Law constitutional); Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.
N.J. 1995) (holding the registration requirements of Megan's Law constitutional and the
notification provisions unconstitutional), rev'd, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); People v.
Afrika, 168 Misc. 2d 618, 626 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).(holding that SORA "[d]oes not
contravene or run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause"); see also Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp.
603,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that retroactive application of the registration provisions
is constitutional but retroactiveapplication of the notificationprovisions is unconstitulional).
6 Eugene Kiely, State Weighs RegisteringSex Offenders; THE RECORD (New Jersey), Aug.
3, 1994, at A3.
I N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C: 7-1-2C:7-11 (West 1995).
' Robert Hanley, Judge Delays Notification In Sex Case, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1996, at
I (noting that the New York sex offender law is "modeled roughly" on the New Jersey law).
'See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367.
'
0 See id. at 390.
" See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); Artway, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.
1996); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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apply to all sex offenders subject to registration and notification laws,
and discusses why New York is likely to face many of the same
challenges. Finally, Section V will draw conclusions about the
constitutionality of SORA in light of the court decisions discussed.
I. Background
Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl living in New Jersey, was
brutally raped and murdered by a twice-convicted sex offender who
lived across the street from her. 2 The murder prompted Megan's
parents, as well as other outraged members of the community, to
publicly demand legislation that would require sex offenders to register
with law enforcement officials and provide the community with
notification of the offenders' whereabouts. 3 The rationale behind such
legislation is that if members of the community are aware that violent
sex offenders reside in their neighborhoods,they are in a better position
to protect themselves and their children. 4 Proponents of Megan's Law
argue high rates of sex offender recidivism as a justification for adopting
2 Kiely, supra note 6. Jesse Timmendequas was charged with the murder of Megan
Kanka. Id. He was "convicted in 1981 of attempted sexual contact and in 1982 of
aggravated assault and attempted sexual assault of a child." Id. The community did not
know about his past criminal history. Id.
"3 See Midge Decter, Megan's Law & the "New York Times." Megan Kanka; Response
to the Editorial Opposing Publication of Sex-Offenders' Place of Residence, AM. JEWISH
COMM., Oct. 1, 1994, at 8. The citizens of Hamilton Township "quickly organized
themselves and began to circulate a petition ... demanding the passage of a state law that
would require correction officials to notify people when a sex offender has moved into their
neighborhood." Id.
14 See Daniel Feldman, Megan's Law: An Asset Or A Quick Fix? An Asset, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
17, 1996, at 2 (noting that citizens who are aware of sex offenders living in the community
can help police with their investigations and in turn possibly prevent a future offense).
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these laws. "5 Studies regarding high rates of recidivism among sex
offenders have been debated, but the results have been inconclusive.1
6
The New York legislature was concerned with findings of high rates of
recidivism among sex offenders and asserted this in support of SORA. 7
An incentive for states to pass registration and notification laws was
provided by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill." The Crime Bill requires sex
offenders to register for ten years with law enforcement agencies and to
verify their residence annually. 9 Sexually violent predators are required
to register and verify residency quarterly for a minimum often years, or
until a determination is made that they no longer pose a risk to the
community." Notification provisions are left to the states and are not
IS See Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender
Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right" to Know,
48 VAND. L. REv. 219, 254 (1995). "After they have served their sentences, sex offenders
presenta unique problem to the criminal justice system because they may have higher rates
of recidivism than other offenders. Thus, sex offenders require special post-sentence
legislative attention." Id.
6 See generally Thomas J. Reed, Reading Goal Revisited: Admission Of Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence In Sex OffenderCases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 146-47 (1993) (noting
that a person's past criminal behavior is a strong predictor of future criminal behavior and
that not all sex offenders have the same criminal histories); Joyce Price, States Find New
Ways ToStopSex Offenders, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at Al. "Dr. Fred Berlin, associate
professorofpsychiatryand founderofthe Sexual DisordersClinic at Johns Hopkins Medical
Institutions, said studies have shown a 'tremendous range of recidivism among pedophiles,
ranging from ten percent to seventy percent."' Id.
17N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996). The Preamble states: "[t]he legislature
finds that the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders, especially those sexually violent
offenderswho commit predatory acts characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior,
and.., the protection of the public from these offenders is of paramount concern or interest
to the government." Id.
18 42 U.S.C.A. §14071 (West 1995) (noting the crime bills' official title, the "Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexual Violent Offender Registration Act").
'9 Id. at § 14071 (b)(3)(a) - (6)(a) (outlining yearly verification procedures that must
continue for ten years after that person "was released from prison, placed on parole,
supervised release, or probation").
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mandatory!' In an effort to encourage states to establish registration and
notificationprocedures for sex offenders, the federal crime bill provides
for the distribution of funds to all states who comply with these
provisions?2 By enacting SORA, New York is now in compliance with
the federal law."
II. New York's Sex Offender Registration Act
The New York legislature approved SORA on the same day that
the New Jersey Supreme Court held Megan's Law constitutional?4 Since
the provisions of SORA are similar to the provisions of Megan's Law,
constitutional challenges made against Megan's Law have also been
made against SORA.25 However, before a comparison of these laws can
be made, a discussion of the New York provisions is necessary.
A. Distinguishing Among Sex Offenders
SORA provides for a board of examiners, appointed by the
governor, that includes three experts in the field of behavior and
21 Id. at (d)(3) (stating that a "state agency may release relevant information that is
necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register").
2 1 Id. at (f)(2) (stating that "astatethat failsto implementthe program as described in this
section shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated to the
state... ").
23 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996).
24 Michael Slackman, NY Has Megan's Law Registry of Sex Offenders to be Available to
the Public, NEWSDAY, July 26, 1995, at A7 [hereinafter "Available to Public"].
25 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 380. Megan's Law was challenged as violating the Due
Process and the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Id. Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(moving for a preliminary injunction enjoining retroactive application of SORA).
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treatment of sex offenders. 6 A sex offender is defined as "any person
who is convicted of one of the various sex offenses set forth in the New
York Penal Code."27 The board of examiners is responsible for
developing guidelines and procedures to assess the potential risks that
sex offenders may pose upon their release from any detention facility.2"
26 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1 (1) (McKinney 1996). The board consists of a total of five
members, the remaining are to be from the Department of Correction.
27 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-(a) (sex offenses applicableto this law are set forth in N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.00 - 130.70).
28N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1 (5) (a-i) (McKinney 1996).
Such guidelines shall be based upon, but not limited to, the following:
(a) criminal history factors indicative of high risk of repeat offense,
including:
(i) whether the sex offender has a mental abnormality;
(ii) whether the sex offender's conduct was found to be characterized by
repetitive and compulsive behavior, associated with drugs or alcohol;
(iii) whether the sex offender served the maximum term;
(iv) whether the sex offender committed the felony sex offense against
a child;
(v) the age of the sex offenderat the time of the commission of the first
sex offense;
(b) other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk,
including:
(i) the relationship between such sex offender and the victim;
(ii) whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence or
infliction of serious bodily injury;
(iii) the number, date and nature of prior offenses;
(c) conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including but
not limited to whether the sex offender is under supervision; receiving
counseling, therapy or treatment; or residing in a home situation that
provides guidance and supervision;
(d) physical conditions that minimize risk of re-offense, including but
not limited to advanced age or debilitating illness;
(e) whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of
recidivism;
(f) the sex offender's response to treatment;
(g) recent behavior, including behavior while confined;
(h) recent threats or gestures against persons or expressions of intent to
commit additional offenses; and
(i) review of any victim impact statement.
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The board will make recommendations to the sentencing judge within
sixty days prior to the sex offender's parole or discharge.2 9 Based on
these recommendations, the judge will classify the sex offender under
one of the following categories:
1) level one: sex offenders who are considered to pose
the lowest risk of recidivism;
2) level two: sex offenders who have a higher risk of
re-offense, but do not reach the level 'of risk associated
with sexually violent predators; and
3) level three: sex offenders who are deemed sexually
violent pose the highest risk of recidivism. These sex
offenders present a potential danger to the community.30
In this regard, SORA is structured along the same lines as
Megan's Law.3 Megan's Law also provides for a three-tiered
classification of sex offenders, with Tier Three offenders considered the
most dangerous. 32 Guidelines for classifying sex offenders in New
Jersey are set by prosecutors?3 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the classification of sex offenders, it ordered that all sex
offenders be provided a hearing to challenge the determinations made
Id. See also People v. Cook, N.Y.L. J., Nov. 22, 1996, at 31 (holding "the procedures set
forth in Correction Law section 168-1(5) are constitutional").29 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1(6).
30 Id.
31 See Don Van Natta Jr., U.S. Judge Blocks State's Plan to Release Names andAddresses
of Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at B6.
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8 (c)(3) (West 1995) (stating that an offender who has been
classified as a high risk poses the most serious threat of recidivism).
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8 (d)(1) (West 1995). "The county prosecutor of the county
where the person was convicted and the county prosecutor of the county where the registered
person will reside ... shall assess the risk of re-offense by the registered person." Id.
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by the prosecutors. 4 This ruling was made to ensure continuing due
process to convicted sex offenders. 5 Due process of law provides a
citizen with "an opportunity to be heard, [and] enforce and protect his
rights before a court. '36 However, the New Jersey judicial system has
experienced difficulty in implementing these hearings because the
legislature has failed to provide the necessary funding and many
attorneys have declined to represent sex offenders on a pro bono basis. 7
New York also provides sex offenders with the opportunity to
challenge a court's determination regarding the level of risk they pose to
the community?8 Courts will inform all sex offenders that they have the
right to have counsel appointed, if necessary, to represent them at these
hearings?9 Individuals contesting the Board's recommendation have the
burden of proof "to controvert the Board's finding. "40 Nevertheless, the
New York law has been challenged on due process grounds because only
the individuals who are incarcerated are given the opportunity to
34 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420. "Thus, we conclude that under both the Federal and
State Constitutions, the Registration and Notification Laws implicate protectable liberty
interests in privacy and reputation, and therefore trigger the right to due process." Id.
35 Id. (stating "[d]ue process is not a fixed concept, however, but a flexible one that
depends on the particular circumstances").
36 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420.
'7 Robert Hanley, 'Megan's Law'Puts Lawyers In A Tough Spot, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 16,
1995, at Bi. Reporting that members of the New Jersey Bar Association are upset about
having to represent indigent sex offenders on a pro bono basis. Id Their primary concern
is that such representation would be "too taxing, especially on small firms" who fear that
they would shoulder the costs associated with such actions, as the legislature has yet to
provide the funding. Id. Indeed, the situation has become so serious that "some lawyers
have threatened to sue the court system and defy orders to handle such cases." Id.
31 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-n(3) (McKinney 1996).
391 Id. at § 168-n(3). "In making the determination [that the offender is a sex offender] the
court shall review any of the victim's statements and any materials submitted by the sex
offender." Id. "The court shall also allow the sex offender to appear and be heard, and
inform the sex offender of his right to have counsel appointed, if necessary." Id.
40 People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
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challenge their classifications before the sentencing judge.4 Because
sex offenders who were on parole or probation at the time the law was
passed did not have the opportunity to challenge their classifications, it
is argued that they are denied due process of law.42 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York has not rendered a decision
on the merits of these arguments.43
B. Registration Provisions
All sex offenders are required to register under the law.4 Prior
to being paroled from prison or released from any hospital, sex offenders
will be informed of their duty to register.45 The facilities will obtain
information regarding the sex offenders' intended place of residence, and
forward that information to law enforcement agencies having
jurisdiction over them.46 Upon their release, sex offenders must verify
this information with the Division of Criminal Justice Services.
4 7
41 See Van Natta Jr., supra note 31 (quoting Thomas O'Brien, a lawyer from the Legal
Aid Society, "[tihe people on probation and parole, who are presumably less of a threat to
society.., are the victims of a unilateral decision made by the state that they have no way
to challenge").
42 Id. (stating that the Legal Aid Society filed an action on behalf of certain sex offenders
because, according to Mr. O'Brien, the law "denies them fundamental due process").
" Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
44 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-f (1) (McKinney 1996). "Any sex offender, who is
discharged, paroled or released from any state or local correctional facility, hospital or
institution shall register with the division within 10 calendar days [of release or discharge].
Id.
45 Id. at §168-e (1).
46 Id.
47 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-f (2)(a)(b) (McKinney 1996). "The sex offender shall mail
the verification form to the division within ten calendar days after receipt of the form." Id.
"The verification form shall be signed by the sex offender, and states that he still resides at
the address last reported to the division." Id.
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Verification is provided by a signed written statement" containing
personal information about the offender.49 Level One andLevel Two
sex offenders must register annually for ten years5" by mailing in their
verification forms." Level Three sex offenders must continue to register
annually beyond ten years, and must verify their residency, in person,
quarterly52 until they are relieved of the duty to do so by a successful
petition to the court for relief.53
C. Notification Provisions
In New York, law enforcement officials will be notified of all
Level One sex offenders, but they may not disseminate that information
I d. at § 168-i. "Registration... shall consist of a statement in writing signed by the sex
offender giving the information that is required by the division ... [which will] enter the
information into an appropriate electronic database or file." Id.
49 Id. at §168-b. The registration form shall contain the following information: "the sex
offender'sname, all aliasesused, date of birth, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, driver's
license number, home address and/or the expected date of domicile." Id. It shall also
contain "a description of the offense for which the sex offender was convicted, the date of
conviction and the sentence imposed." Id.
50 Id. at §168-h. "The duration of registration for a sex offender shall be annually for a
period of ten years from the initial date of registration, provided, however, that for a sexually
violent predator, he shall annually register and verify quarterly for a minimum of ten years
unless the court determines ... [otherwise]." Id.
" Id. at § 168-f(2)(a).
32 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-f (3) (McKinney 1996). "[Al sex offender designated as a
sexually violent predatormust personally verify with the local law enforcement agency the
registrationevery ninety calendar days after the date of the initial release or commencement
of parole." Id.
13 Id. at § 168-o (stating that a petition for relief may be granted by the sentencing court
upon determination that the sex offender no longer poses a threat).
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to the public. 4 Information about Level Two sex offenders may be
disseminated "to any entity with vulnerable populations related to the
nature of the offense committed by such sex offenders.' 5 Those entities
may further disseminate that information at their discretion. 6 For
example, if a pedophile moves near a school, the police may notify the
school board, and the school board may then in turn notify the entire
district about the potential danger imposedon the community by the sex
offender residing near the school." In addition to the notification
provisions provided for Level Two sex offenders, information regarding
Level Three offenders will be available upon request to the public
through a subdirectory. 8 The local police will provide information
available to-any person who submits a written statement expressing a
purpose for the information requested. 9 In addition, a "900" telephone
number is available for citizens to inquire about sex offenders.6"
4 Id. at § 168-1 (6)(a). "If the risk of repeat offense is low, a level one designation shall
be given to such sex offender." Id. "In such case the law enforcement agency having
jurisdiction and the law enforcement agency having had jurisdiction at the time of conviction
shall be notified .... Id.
55 Id. at § 168-1 (6)(b).
56 Id.
"7 Michael Slackman, NY's Megan's Law Begins Today, But Details Not Final,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 1996, at A6 (explaining that police have the discretion to notify school
boards about pedophiles since they may pose a threat to children, and school boards have the
discretion to order district-wide notifications).
51 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1 (6)(c) (McKinney 1996). "The information [including
address, photo and background information] shall also be provided in the subdirectory
established in this article and... such information shall, upon request, be made available to
the public." Id.
5 Id. at §168-q (1). "A copy of the subdirectory shall annually be distributed to the
offices of local village, town, or city police departments for the purposes of public access."
Id. "Such departments shall require that a person in writing express a purpose in order to
have access to the subdirectory and such department shall maintain these requests." Id.
6 Id. at §168-p (1). "The division shall also operate a "900" telephone number that
members of the public may call and inquire whether a named individual required to register
... is listed." Id. "The Division shall ascertain Whether a named person reasonably appears
to be a person so listed and provide the caller with the relevant information according to the
risk . I..." d.
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Citizens must provide information about themselves before any
information concerning sex offenders will be provided.6 Critics of
notification laws argue that distributing information about sex offenders
in this manner will lead angry citizens to vigilantism.62 In an effort to
safeguard against this, New York will hold citizens criminally liable if
they use the information they obtain about sex offenders for these
purposes.63
Il. Retroactive Application
SORA applies retroactively to past offenders. 64 Applying laws
retroactively may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. and New
York Constitutions. 5 Proponents of Megan's Law argue that for the law
6 Id. at §168-p (2)(c) (stating that a recording will notify the caller that he must identify
himself, that his phone number will be recorded and that the caller's name and address will
be kept on file).
62 See generally Edward Martone, When A Sex Offender Moves In, Is There A Duty To
Warn The Community? No: Mere Illusion Of Safety Creates Climate Of Vigilante Justice,
81 A.B.A. J., at 38 (1995).
63 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § ! 68-p(2)(e) (McKinney 1996). The statute contains a warning
that it is "illegal to use information obtained through the "900" number to commit a crime
against any person listed .... " Id.
64 Id. at § i 68-g.
65 U.S. CONST. art. I §10; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1 §9, cl.3. Other states analyzing
registration and notification laws have also relied on federal case law based on constitutional
similarities; State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Ariz. 1992) (stating that Arizona's Ex
Post Facto Clause is similarto that in the U.S. Constitution). But see State v. Costello, 643
A.2d 531, 532 (N.H. 1994) (explaining that the Court decided the matter under the state
constitutionand used federal law for supplemental assistance because ex post facto analysis
of the New Hampshire sex offender statute is the same under both the federal and state
constitutions).
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to be effective it must apply to all sex offenders.66 They argue that if
SORA only applied to future sex offenders, then members of the
community would not be informed of the dangerous sex offenders
already residing in the neighborhood, decreasing the law's
effectiveness.67
In Calder v. Bull, 6 the Supreme Court defined the Ex Post Facto
Clause.6 9 Ex Post Facto is defined as: "[E]very law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
crime, when committed."7 Therefore, past offenders may argue that
registration and notification laws changes the punishment imposed on
them by inflicting a greater punishment than was allowed at the time
they committed the sex offense.7 There is disagreement among state
and federal courts as to whether registration and community notification
66 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 372. "The legislature reached the irresistible conclusion that
if community safety was its objective, there was no justification for applying these laws only
to those who offend or who are convicted in the future, and not applying them to previously
convicted offenders." Id. If the law were to only apply to future offenders, it would provide
no protection from the risk of re-offense by those previously convicted and released
offenders who were already in the community. Id.
67 id.
68 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
69 Id. at 390. Chief Justice Chase stated four laws he would consider ex post facto:
I) every law that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which, was innocent when
done, criminal; and punishes such action;
2) every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when committed;
3) every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed; and
4) every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the
offense, in order to convict the offender. Id.
70 Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 672 (applying this definition in deciding whether the New
Jersey law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause).
"' See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 691; Afrika, 168 Misc. 2d at 618.
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laws constitute punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.72
A. New Jersey's Megan's Law
In Doe v. Poritz, 73 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that,
[a] statute that can fairly be characterized as
remedial, both in its purpose and implementing
provisions, does not constitute punishment even
though its remedial provisions have some inevitable
deterrent impact and even though it may indirectly
and adversely affect, potentially severely, some of
those subject to its provisions. Such a law does not
become punitive simply because its impact, in part,
may be punitive unless the only explanation for that
impact is a punitive purpose: an intent to punish.74
The Doe Court applied federal case law in rendering their
decision. 75  The Court discussed the history of the legislation and
concluded that Megan's Law was clearly a response to sex offender
recidivism,76 and therefore remedial.7 7 The Doe Court held that because
Megan's law is not punitive,78 the Ex Post Facto Clause was not
72 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 442; Artway 81 F.3d at 1271; Afrika 183 Misc.2d at
626; Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 63 1.
7' 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
71 Id. at 388.
75 Id.
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-1 (West 1995) "The legislature finds and declares: the danger
of recidivism posed by sex offenders ... require[s] a system of registration that will permit
law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public
safety." Id.
77 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404. "The legislative intent, based on the history of the
legislation and recitals in the laws themselves is clearly and totally remedial in purpose ..
.." Id.
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triggered.79
The plaintiff in Doe asserted two claims regarding the Ex Post
Facto Clause. First, since the registration and notification laws could
have a deterrent effect on sex offenders, it may be punitive."0 Second,
the impact of Megan's Law on offenders may be so severe as to
constitute punishment.8" The Court rejected both claims.8 2 In United
States v. Halper,3 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[a] civil as well
as criminal sanction constitutespunishment when the sanction as applied
to the individual case serves the goals of punishment.' 4 The Court went
on to state that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
a retributive or deterrent purpose is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term."85 Relying on the language in Halper, the Doe
Court interprets the word "serve" to mean "purpose," "in the sense of
intended goal," rather than "impact."8 6 According to the Doe Court,
Megan's law is remedial because protecting the community from danger
8 Id. at 390. The Court stated that when determining whether a law is punitive, one
consideration is whether the legislative intent was regulatory or punitive. Id. If the
legislative intent was to punish, then the law is punitive. Id.
'9 See id. at 389 (noting "the critical role of punishment in triggering the Ex Post Facto
Clause").
80 d.
81 Id.
2 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 389. "Plaintiff asserts correctly that deterrence and
retribution are the main characteristicsof criminal sanctions and, not correctly, that any law
or sanction having either of those characteristics is to that extent punitive .... Id.
83 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
84 Id. at 448. The issue in Halper was "whether and under what circumstances a civil
penalty may constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at
447.
85 Id.
86 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 393-95 (explainingthat the critical factor in interpreting the
Ex Post Facto Clause "serves the purpose of punishment" is intent and not impact).
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is a regulatory goal.87 In addressing the deterrent impact of the law, the
Court was skeptical of whether compulsive sex offenders would be
deterred from committing crimes with registration and notification laws
in effect since the sex offenders were not deterred by the notion of being
incarcerated!' And even if the law did deter sex offenders, it would just
be an inevitable consequence of the law.89 Finally, the Doe Court
concluded that when determining whether a law constitutes punishment,
a deterrent impact will not transform the law into punishment provided
that the legislative purpose and implementing provisions are solely
remedial.90
However, a federal district court held that the notification
provisions of Megan's law were unconstitutional.9 In Artway v.
Attorney General of New Jersey, the Court applied the factors set forth
in Kennedy v. Mendoza- Martine2 l to determine whether Megan's Law
was regulatory or punitive. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court set forth the
following factors to determine whether a law was penal or regulatory:
1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint;
2) whether [the sanction] has been historically
regarded as punishment;
3) whether [the sanction] comes into play only on a
finding of scienter;
' Id. at 404. "There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate
regulatory goal." Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)).
8 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404.
89 Id. at 389 (statingthat "[i]n the expostfacto area, careful reading of some of the cases
is necessary to avoid misunderstanding the rule that a law solely remedial does not violate
this constitutional provision simply because it may have inevitable deterrent consequences').
90 Id. at 404-5.
9' Artway, 876 F.Supp. at 692.
92 372 U.S. 144 (1962). In Kennedy, the Supreme Court considered whether a sanction
was either civil or criminal and thus subject to Fifth and Sixth Amendment procedural
safeguards. Id.
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4) whether [the sanction's] operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence;
5) whether the behavior to which [the statute] applies
is already a crime;
6) whether an alternative purpose to which [the
statute] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it; and
7) whether [the statute] appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.93
In Artway, the Court found that these factors weighed in favor
of finding the law punitive.94 Focussing on the fourth and sixth factors
of the Kennedy test, the Artway Court held that while the law may have
an alternative purpose, namely to protect the public, "that
purpose-regardless how artfully the legislature has couched it-is
extricably linked to deterrence: a traditional element of punishment."95
The Artway Court limited its holding to retroactive application of the
notification provisions only. 6 The Doe v. Poritz Court attributed the
holding in Artway to a misapplication of the Kennedy test.97 The Doe
9Id. at 168 (hereinafter "Kennedy" test).
94Artway, 876 F.Supp. at 692. The Court noted that
[b]ased on the foregoing analysis of Megan's Law under the factors set
forth by the Supreme Court in Kennedy, and the fact that most, if not all
of those factors weigh in favor of finding the law to be punitive, the
Court must conclude that the Legislature'sstated intent for Megan's law
is outweighed by those factors. Id.
The court did find the third factor to weigh in favor of finding Megan's Law regulatory by
giving deference to the legislature's findings that certain sex offenders pose a high risk of
recidivism. Id. at 690.
95Id. at 691.
96 Id. at 692.
" Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 397. In Poritz, the Court refers to the test as the "Mendoza-
Martineztest." Id at 399. See, e.g., Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 673 (discussing the application
of the Kennedy test to ex post facto review in the context of sex offender registration and
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Court interpreted the Kennedy test as "useful only in determining the
underlying nature of the proceeding, not the question of whether
punishment is imposed by a civil sanction."'98 The Doe Court cited
Austin v. United States 9 for the proposition that the Kennedy test has
been rejected by the Supreme Court as improper for determining
whether a law constitutes punishment.'
In Austin, the Supreme Court stated that the government's
reliance on the Kennedy.test was misplaced since the issue was whether
forfeiture was punishment, and not whether it was civil or criminal.'
Based on the decisions in Austin and Halper, the Doe Court concluded
that the Kennedy test was not the proper analysis for determining
whether a law constitutes punishment in the ex post facto context.'0 2 Yet,
in Artway, the district court determined that the Kennedy test was the
proper analysis in determining whether a statute is "punitive as opposed
notification laws), rev'd, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). See generally Abraham Abramovsky,
Megan's Law: Is it Constitutional? And is it Moral? N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1995, at 3
(discussing constitutionalityof Megan's Law statutes in various jurisdictions including New
York).
9 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 402; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447
n.7 (1989) (holding that "in determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes
criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the
underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated").
99 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (deciding the issue of whether forfeiture constituted
punishment in the context of excessive fines).
00. Id. at n.6 (noting that because the issue was not the reclassification of the penalty as
civil or criminal, the government'sreliance on the Kennedy test was "misplaced," and stating
whether punishment is actually imposed is a "separate question" and thus the Kennedy test
is "not employed").
"'1 Id. (stating that "[i]n addressing whether punishment is being imposed the Court has
not employed the tests articulated in Kennedy... ").
0 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 402 (noting that the Supreme Court had rejected the
Kennedy test in determining whether punishment existed in the excessive fines context in
Austin, and in determining whether punishment existed in the double jeopardy context in
Halper).
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to regulatory in the ex post facto context." 103
The Artway decision was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals." 4 The Court rejected the Kennedy test, °5 and articulated a
three-prong test for determining whether a statute was regulatory or
punitive.0 6 The Court considered actual purpose, objective purpose and
effect of the statute.0 7 This test is an attempt "to harmonize a body of
doctrine that has caused much disagreement in the federal and state
courts."'0 8 The Court applied this test to the registration provisions of
Megan's Law and held they did not constitute punishment, and therefore
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.0 9 The Court reasoned that the
actual purpose as expressed by the legislature was to protect the public
and not to punish." 0 In applying the second prong of this test, the Court
discussed three sub-parts.'''
'o Artway, 876 F.Supp. at 673 n.8 (interpreting Kennedy as the proper analysis in
determining whether a statute is punitive in the ex postfacto context). The Court inArtway
found the sex offender registration requirement of Megan's Law constitutional but found
both the Tier One and Tier Two notification provisions unconstitutional in their retroactive
application. Id. at 692. See generally Michael Booth, State, U.S. Rift Leaves Megan's Law
Fate Unclear, N. J. L. J., July 31, 1995 (discussing Artway and whether Megan's Law could
be considered punitive in light of recent Supreme Court decisions).
"4 Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
0 Id. at 1262 n.26. Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals rejected
the Kennedy test as the proper analysis to invoke for determining whether a law constitutes
punishmentin the expostfacto, but criticizedthe New Jersey Supreme Court for relying on
authoritiesthat, "like Kennedy, pertain to the question of whether a proceeding is sufficiently
criminal in nature to warrant protection under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." Id. The
Court of Appeals also disagreed with the New Jersey Court's "neglect of history underAustin
and its total disregard of effects" in the lower court's analysis of Megan's Law. Id. However,
the Court of Appeals then notes that even if it had applied the Kennedy test, the registration
provisions would not constitute punishment. Id. at 1263 n.27.
106 Id. at 1263.
1
07 
Id.
108 Id.
'
09 Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267.
"Old. at 1264.
... Id. at 1263.
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First, citing Halper, the Court asked "whether the law could be
explained solely by a remedial purpose." '112  Second, "whether
registration resembles punishment through a historical analysis."" 3 The
Court answered both questions in the affirmative, acknowledging that
registration was a "longstanding regulatory technique with a remedial
purpose,""4 and the solely remedial purpose was to aid law enforcement
officials "keep tabs on offenders.""' 5 The Court further stated that unlike
a scarlet letter, sex offenders who register with law enforcement officials
would not face public humiliation because most of the information
pertaining to them is already included in public records and is disclosed
solely to law enforcement officials who are presumed to obey the law.1 6
In applying the third sub-part, the Court stated,
[i]f the legislature did not intend a law to be retributive
but did intend it to serve some mixture of deterrent and
salutary purposes, [a court] must determine (1) whether
historically the deterrent purpose of such a law is a
necessary complement to its salutary operation, and (2)
whether the measure under consideration, operated in its
'usual' manner is consistent with its historically mixed
purposes.""'  The Court further stated [u]nless, the
partially deterrent measure meets both of these criteria,
it is 'punishment."'
The Court concluded that "any incidental purpose to deter future
112 Arlway, 81 F.3d at 1263.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1264.
15 Id. at 1265.
116 Id.
"' Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 (citing Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767 (1994).
118 Id.
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offense by past sex offenders" would not invalidate the statute." 9
The Court did not apply the three-prong test to the notification
provisions because the issue was not ripe for determination.2 ° However,
the appeals court dictum suggested that the notification provisions may
fail the second and third prongs. 2' The Third Circuit stated that because
community notification resembles a scarlet letter, sex offenders may be
subjected to public ostracism, opprobrium, vigilantism, and loss of
employment, creating "devastating effects."'22
B. Similar Jurisdictional Approaches
Other jurisdictions applying the Kennedy test have arrived at
different conclusions. In State v. Noble,'23 the Arizona Supreme Court
held retroactive application of the Arizona sex offender registration
statute constitutional.'24 Since the legislative history did not indicate
what the legislative intent was for enacting the statute, the Court applied
the Kennedy test to determine whether the statute was intended to be
"' Id. at 1266 (citing Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767).
20 Artway, 81 F.3d at 1252. The Court stated that Artway's challenge to the notification
provisions of Megan's Law is not ripe because "unlike registration, notification involves a
crucial contingency: only if, after registering, Artway is classified as a moderate or high risk
of re-offense, will he face notification." Id. at 1248.
121 Id. at 1265 (noting "Artway's argument has considerable force, but the notification
issue is not before us"); see also Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 615-16 (noting in Artway,
the Court "observed that the plaintiff had marshalled strong reasons that notification would
have devastating effects").
122 Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265.
123 829 P.2d 1217 (1992).
124 Id. at 1224 (holding that "Arizona's sex offender registration statute, A.R.S. § 13-3821,
is regulatory in nature and not an unconstitutional ex post facto law when applied to ...
defendants convicted after the enactment of the statute for offenses pre-dating the enactment
of the statute").
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regulatory or punitive.25 In weighing the factors of the Kennedytest, the
Noble Court concluded the "overriding purpose" of the sex offender
registration statute was to aid law enforcement officials in protecting
children from sex offenders.1 26  This purpose was "unrelated to
punishing [the defendants] for past offenses."'' 27 It is important to note
that unlike New York, Arizona only requires sex offenders to register,
and does not require community notification.2 2 The Noble Court's
language indicates that if the Arizona law provided community
notification perhaps the Kennedy factors would have weighed in favor
of finding the law punitive.1
2 1
In State v. Ward,3' the Supreme Court of Washington held
constitutional the retroactive application of the Community Protection
Act, 3 ' which requires sex offenders to register with law enforcement
officials.3 2 Like SORA, the Washington Community Protection Act
123 Id. at 1220.
126 Id. at 1224. The Court stated that its job is "not to count the factors on each side, but
to weigh them." Id. The Court acknowledged that the statute has both punitive and
regulatory effects, however, potentially punitive effects were mitigated by the confidentidity
of the registration process. Id. The government determined that aiding law enforcement
officials was the factor which weighed most heavily in their favor. Id.
217 id.
.2 State v. Noble, 829 P. 2d at 1224 (noting that "registrants are not forced to display a
scarlet letter to the world; outside of a few regulatory exceptions, the information provided
by sex offenders pursuant to the registration statute is kept confidential," and on this basis
concluded that any "potentially punitive aspects of the statute" were thus mitigated).
9 Id. (suggesting that based on "several of the Mendoza-Martinez factors," community
notification may be "potentiallypunitive," and suggestingthat it is the confidentiality of the
registration information provided by sex offenders which mitigated any punitive effects).
' 869 P.2d 1062 (1994).
Ial Id. at 1065 (referring to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A. 44.130 (West 1996).
2 Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074. In holding the Community Protection Act's for registration
requirement non-punitive,the offenders in question were not "disadvantaged' by the statute,
even though registration was burdensome. Id. at 1068. The Court in Ward first looked to
the legislative purpose of the statute then turned to the factors listed in Kennedy to determine
whether the effect of the statute was regulatory or punitive. Id. at 1068.
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provides for community notification,'33 however, unlike SORA, the
Washington law includes involuntary commitment provisions for
sexually violent offenders. 3 ' In comparing the Washington statute to
the Arizona statute, the Washington Supreme Court stated that providing
community notification did not "alter their conclusion" that the purpose
of the Act was regulatory.' Weighing the factors of the Kennedy test,
the Court concluded that "the requirementto register does not constitute
punishment."' 36 A federal district court in Young v. Weston'37 held the
Washington statute unconstitutional.' The Young Court applied the
Kennedy test and concluded that the "statute cannot be classified as
civil."' 39 In Rowe v. Burton,4 ° the Alaska Supreme Court applied the
Kennedy test to the Alaska Registration Act 4' and held community
notification violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
SId at 1070; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §4.24.550(1) (West 1996).
114 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.010 et. seq. (West 1996).
135 Id.
136 Id. But see People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637 (I11. 1991). The issue in Adams was
whether the registration act violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. The Court did not apply the Kennedy test because the "legislative
intent was clearly non-penal." Id. Since the statute did not provide for community
notification, the Court concluded "no stigma attaches." Id. at 381-90.
'37 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
13 1 Id. at 753 (holding that retroactive application of the statute violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
139 Id. at 752 (stating that the Kennedy test weighed in favor of finding the statute
unconstitutionalbecause it affects behavior that is already criminal, promotes retribution and
deterrence, and creates loss of liberty to the sex offenders).
14' 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994).
41 ALASKA STAT. §12.63.010 (Michie 1996).
142 Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378-80.
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C. New York's SORA
SORA has recently been challenged as a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.'43 The Legal Aid Society of New York and the New York
Civil Liberties Union brought a class action suit on behalf of all sex
offenders required to comply with notification provisions who were
convicted prior to the passage of the law.' In Doe v. Pataki, the district
court held retroactive application of the community notification
provisions unconstitutional,' and granted the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the notification
provisions, pending a trial on the merits of the case.'46
The Court in Doe stated that plaintiffs seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that irreparable harm will occur without the
injunction, and that there is a likelihood of success on the merits.'47 In
Doe, plaintiffs cited incidents of harassment, job loss, and threats of
physical harm associated with individuals subjected to the notification
provisions of SORA.' The Court held that the plaintiffs had shown that
they were likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not
granted.'49 In determining whether the plaintiffs had a likelihood of
success on the merits, the Court had to decide whether the notification
' See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 693.
144 Id.
'45 Id. at 701-02. The Court limited its holding to retroactive application of the
notification provisions only because the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction based
solely upon the notification provisions, and because, as the Court noted, registration with the
police would not cause irreparable harm since the police could obtain the information by
other means. Id. at 698.
46Id. at 702 (stating that "defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons acting in
concert with them are preliminarily enjoined from enforcing New York's [SORA]").
14" Id. at 697.
'.. Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 698.
"41 Id. (stating that plaintiffs met their burden by showing that "injury is likely and
imminent, not remote or speculative, and not fully remedied by money damages").
202 [Vol. X1II
NEW YORK'S MEGAN'S LA W
provisions were punitive or regulatory. 5 ° Four factors in the Kennedy
test convinced the Doe Court that the notification provisions were
punitive. First, has notification traditionally been viewed as punitive?
Second, did it serves the goals of punishment? Third, did it place an
affirmative disability and restraint on the plaintiffs? Fourth, are its
provisions triggered by behavior that is already a crime?.5' As an
additional factor, the Court noted that while community notification may
have a regulatory purpose, namely to protect the public, the "effect is to
punish."' 52 The Court held that since the notification provisions were
punitive, retroactive application of the law was unconstitutional.'
Six months later on cross-motions for summary judgment, the
district court permanently enjoined the community notification
provisions of SORA.' 54 The Court held the notification provisions of
SORA were in fact punitive, and therefore retroactive application would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.' 55 Although the District Court was
confronted with the same issue, its analysis was slightly different.'56
Like the Third Circuit, the Court discussed the various tests, and then
adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach.'57 In concluding that
SORA's notification provisions were punitive, the Court discussed four
factors: intent, design, history, and effects. 5 First, the Court noted that
while the subjective intent of the legislature may be found in SORA's
preamble describing the Act's regulatory aim,'59 debates in the New
York State Assembly reveal that the legislature's actual intent was to
15o Id. at 698-99.
'' Id. at 700-01.
152 Id. at 701.
153 Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 701.
'5' Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 631.
151 Id. at 629.
156 Id. at 620. The Court's "analytical approach" is slightly different, as it still considers
the Kennedy factors applied in its earlier decision. Id.
' Id. See also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 ("synthesizing the jurisprudence").
.58 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 620.
59 Id. at 603.
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punish. 6' Second, the Court concluded that SORA's design contains
"classic indicia of a punitive scheme."'' Third, the Court discussed the
history of the legislation and concluded that "public notification is the
modern day equivalent of branding and shaming. "112 The Court
determined that "sex offenders have been banished literally and
psychologically."'63 Finally, the Court concluded that the effects of
community notification prohibit sex offenders from "re-integrating into
society, '  and promoted "three traditional goals of punishment:
deterrence, retribution and incapacitation."'65
The Court concluded that the registration provisions were not
punitive since "registration serves a valid regulatory goal,"'66 that cannot
be accomplished privately,'67 that registration was not historically
considered punishment, 6 ' and does not restrain or inhibit an offender's
activities in "any significant way."'69 Even if registration serves as a
deterrent, "the non-punitive effects outweigh[s] the punitive. '
61 Id. at 622.
161 Id. at 623. "[]t's provisions are triggered by behavior that is 'already a crime."' Id.
The Court also stated that SORA is excessive because it "includes thirty-six offenses, and
includes public disclosure of all registrants, including those at the lowest risk level." Id. at
623-24.
162 Id. at 625.
163 Id, at 626 (stating that sex offenders have been banished literally because they are
forced to relocate, and psychologically because "public notification has made it difficult if
not impossible to re-integrate into society").
164 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 628.
65 Id. at 629.
166 Id. (stating"[r]egistrationplainly serves the valid regulatory goal of the Act to protect
the public and aid law enforcement").
167 Id. at 630. Unlike notification provisions of SORA, the registration provisions require
information regarding sex offenders to be kept on file with law enforcement agencies and
does not require public disclosure. Id.
168 Id.
169 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 630.
170 Id.
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However, in People v. Afrika,17' a lower New York court held
SORA's notification and registration provisions did not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 72 In reaching this decision, the Court rejected the
analysis employed by the federal district court.'7 3 The Court cited
UnitedStates v. Ursery,'74 the Supreme Court's most recent decision on
punishment. 171 In Ursery, the Supreme Court applied a two-part test to
determine whether civil forfeiture was punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 176  Under this test, a court must determine
whether the legislative intent in enacting a law is criminal or civil, 177 and
whether the law is "so punitive" that it may not "legitimately be viewed
as civil in nature."'1
7 8
In Afrika, the Court cites SORA's preamble as evidence that the
New York'legislature intended the Act to be a remedial measure.179 The
Court noted that the legislature stated that its purpose for enacting
SORA was to assist law enforcement officials whose efforts to protect
the community "is impaired by lack of information.'.. ° The Court
further stated that SORA was carefully designed to support the
legislative regulatory goal, because the Act only authorizes disclosure
of information concerning sex offenders who are deemed to pose the
... See Afrika, 168 Misc. 2d 618.
172 Id. at 626.
... Id. at 619 (statingthat "although adjudicatinga question of federal constitutional law,
[Doe v. Pataki], is not binding on this Court").
1
74 
-- U.S. -- , 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
"5 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 617 (noting that United States v. Ursery was the
Supreme Court's most recent decision on punishment).
176 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
'
77 Id. at 2147.
178 Id.
'
79Afrika, 168 Misc. 2d at 622 (stating that the "preamble, in this Court's opinion, evinces
an unmistakable intent to promote public safety and enhance law enforcement efforts..
'
80 Id. at 622.
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greatest threat to public safety.' The Court addressed the second part
of the test by stating "only the clearest proof that the Act is in fact,
punitive, will suffice to transform what was intended as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty."'8 2 This threshold was not met since the Court
stated that SORA "is a measured attempt to achieve remedial with
attendant deterrent goals."'8 3 The Court agreed with the conclusion
reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz, and asserted
that "the mere fact that a law is responsive to a person's prior criminal
conduct is insufficient to render it punitive."'8 4
In W.P. v. Poritz,'5 a federal court in New Jersey held both Tier
Two and Three notification provisions of Megan's Law did not violate
the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses. 6 The Court concluded
that "Ursery affected the approach employed in analyzing Megan's
Law,"'8 7 and therefore, declined to follow the test articulated by the
Third Circuit.'
Ultimately, the Supreme. Court must determine the proper
analysis for whether retroactive application of SORA violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause.8 9 The district court's decision is currently before the
Second Circuit. 9° It is difficult to determine what "test" the Second
Circuit would invoke for its analysis of the SORA provisions because
"81 Id. (stating that the notification provisions "are carefully graduated so as to more
closely fit and conform to those evaluated as presenting a greater propensity to repeat or
escalate their criminal transgressions").
"' Id. at 623 (citing Ursery).
183 Id. at 624.
14 Afrika, 168 Misc. 2d at 625.
5 W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F.Supp. 1199 (D. N.J. 1996).
'
6 Id. at 1209.
.
7
. ld at 1223.
"88 Id. at 1208 (stating the "approach of Artway need not and should not be followed,
because it is not a binding precedent for the issues and claims presented").
8'9 See Available To Public, supra note 24 (stating that,"it is expected that the federal
constitutional issues eventually will be decided by the United States Supreme Court").
90 Bill Alden, Megan's Law Appeal Argued in 2d Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7, 1997, at 1.
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there has not been uniform review. 9' If, upon review ,the Second
Circuit is in conflict with the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court must
provide some uniformity. 192
Critics of community notification argue that public
dissemination of information concerning sex offenders violates many of
their constitutional rights.'93 Some opponents of Megan's Law concede
that the law was meant to regulate sex offenders, but argue punishment
with regard to public notification is an inevitable consequence of the
law, regardless of the legislative intent.'94 The New Jersey Supreme
Court focused on legislative intent rather than the impacts of Megan's
Law in rendering its decision. 95 The Court stated:
[t]he fact that some deterrent punitive impact may result
[from a regulatory law, with implementing provisions
that are also regulatory] does not, however, transform
those provisions into 'punishment' if the impact is an
inevitable consequence of the regulatory provision, as
distinguished from an impact that results from
'excessive'provisions, provisionsthat do not advance the
'9' But see Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 617 n.9. Judge Chin's opinion noted that in
United States v. Certain Funds, available in 1996 WL 521188, No. 2234 (2d Cir. Sept. 6,
1996), the Second Circuit "applied Ursery in holding that civil forfeiture was not criminal
or punitive of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. Furthermore, Judge Chin stated that, "Ursery
supports the conclusion that notification is punitive, since the Supreme Court contrasted in
rem forfeiture proceedings with punitive or potentially punitive in personam proceedings."
Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 618 n.12.
192 See Michele Salcedo, Judge Says No: Part of Megan's Law For Sex Criminals is
StruckDown, NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 1996, at A8 (stating"if the Second Circuit upholds Chin
... the stage is set for an appeal to the Supreme Court").
193 See Jerusalem, supra note 16, at 250 (arguing that "public notification infringes on
former offender's rights").
194 Id.
... See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 396. "What counts is the purpose and design of the
statutory provision, its remedial goal and purpose, and not the resulting consequential
impact, the 'sting of punishment, that may inevitably, but incidentally flow from it."' Id.
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regulatory purpose.'96
The problem with this analysis is that community notification
laws are not considered to be solely regulatory. 9 7  The regulatory
purpose can be determined by looking at the legislative history.' New
York enacted SORA for the same reasons as New Jersey, as a reaction
to the threat that repeat sex offenders pose to their communities.'99
Protecting the public from crime is a legitimate regulatory function of
the state. 2"°  However, it is the implementation of community
notification laws which concern the challengers because of the punitive
effect.20' Challengers consider community notification excessive.
2 2
Manyjurisdictionshave challenged sex offender registration and
notification laws because they are deemed punitive. Overall,
registration requirements are more accepted than public notification
provisions?0 3 Several arguments have been asserted against community
notification. Some opponents argue that community notification is
196 Id. at 405.
197 See Jerusalem, supra note 16, at 230 (stating that notification laws are also found to
be punitive).
"' See Afrika, 168 Misc. 2d at 622. But see Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 621 (stating
that the "inquiry into legislative intent, however, does not end with the preamble").
199 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168 (McKinney 1996).
219 Id. "The system of registering sex offenders is a proper exercise of the state's police
power regulating present and ongoing conduct." Id.
211 See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 701. In discussing the punitive impacts of
community notification laws, Judge Chin stated, "[o]ne could argue, depending on the crime
involved, that these individualsdeserved this treatment." Id. "One cannot argue, however,
that this treatment was necessary to serve the Act's stated goals." Id. "Hence, the effect of
public notification provisions are to punish." Id.
202 See generallySex Offenders:Are They Punished Enough?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 16, 1995, at 19.
203 See Jerusalem, supra note 16,' at 238-39 (arguing registration requirements for
dangerous sex offenders are likely to be upheld because "courts and legislatures agree that
any potential rights infringementsare outweighed by the requirements'contributionto public
safety").
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analogous to the "scarlet letter. '2°4 Singling out sex offenders through
community notification has been compared to "branding" sex
offenders." 5 Opponents view this as punishing the sex offender forever
since community notification continues to punish sex offenders after
they have paid their debts to society through incarceration.0 6 Problems
arise when sex offenders undergo treatment and try to rehabilitate
themselves.2 7 Notification laws may inhibit those sex offenders from
rehabilitatingthemselves because they may feel banned and harassed by
the community, and may strike back as a result.2 8
Proponents of the law argue that community notification is
needed for community protection, pointing to high rates of sex offender
recidivism?0 9 In addition to the notion that access to information about
sex offenders will enable citizens to protect themselves,210 proponents
believe community notification may even deter sex offenders.2 '
Deterrence, like retribution, is "a traditional goal of punishment. '"21 2 So
even under the Halper analysis used by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
community notification statutes may be construed as "serving the goals
24 See generally id. at 227.
205 See id. at 224-25.
206 See Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual
Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J. L. POL'Y 569, 584 (1995) (stating that "[alithough
released offenders have supposedly paid their debt to society, society tends to attach negative
stigmas to offenders long after their release from prison").
207 See id. (arguing this stigma interferes with the ability of sex offender to resume a
normal life).
208 See Tracy L. Silva, Comment, Dial "1-900-Pervert" And Other Statutory Measures
That Provide Public Notification of Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REV. 1961, 1985 (1995)
(arguing that a "consequence of public notification laws may [cause] many offenders who
might have been helped through therapy [to] forego that option").
209 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996). But see Reed, supra note 15.
20 See Feldman, supra note 14.
2 1 See Jerusalem, supra note 16, at 239 (noting registration statutes may have a deterrent
effect on a few sex offenders who know they are on a list of suspects in police departments,
but it will not solve the problem of rehabilitating the offenders).
2"2 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. The third Kennedy factor refers to
retribution and deterrence as the traditional aims of punishment. Id.
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of punishment. '21 3  Therefore, even if the Supreme Court adopts the
Halper analysis for evaluating whether the law is punitive in the ex post
facto context, there is no guarantee that retroactive application will be
upheld.2 " To some extent then, the fate of SORA lies in the
interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 215 The Supreme Court must
ultimately decide what constitutes punishment under the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Once this standard is articulated it may be applied to SORA to
determine whether the registration and notification provisions constitute
punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Even though New
York may repeal the retroactive provision, the law may still face other
constitutional challenges.2"6
IV. Other Constitutional Challenges Based On Punishment
SORA may be challenged as violating other constitutional
provisions based on the punitive nature of the statute. Sex offender
2 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (holding that after being criminally punished,
a defendant may not be subject to additional civil sanctions unless such sanctions can "fairly
be characterized as remedial"). The Court stated that "a civil as well as criminal sanction
constitutespunishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals
of punishment." ld
214 But see United States v. Ursery, -- U.S. --, 116. S.Ct. 2135, 2144 (1996) (citing United
Statesv. One Assortmentof89 Firearms,465 U.S. 354 (1984))(stating "though... statutes
may fairly be said to serve the purposes of deterrence, we long have held that this purpose
may serve civil as well as criminal goals").
211 See Joel B. Rudin, Megan's Law: Can It Stop Sexual Predators and at What Cost to
Constitutional Rights? I 1 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SECTION 62 (1996) (stating that "the fate of
Megan's Law may rest upon the Supreme Court's view of the underlying historical purposes
of the Ex Post Facto Clause").
216 See David Glovin, Judge Takes Punch Out Of Megan's Law Community Notice
Unconstitutional, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Mar. 1, 1995, at A l (quoting Ronald Chen,
Professor of Law at Rutgers University as saying: "[liawmakers could repeal the retroactive
portions of Megan's Law, but community notification could run afoul of privacy rights").
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registration statutes in other jurisdictions have been challenged on the
grounds that they violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.1 7 Before analyzing whether registration
and community notification statutes are cruel and unusual punishment,
the Supreme Court must determine if the statutes are punitive.2 '1 If the
law is not punitive, then Eighth Amendment analysis will not be
triggered.2 9 However, if a statute is found to be punitive, then the
Supreme Court must consider whether the punishment imposed by the
law is proportional to the crime.221 In Solem v. Helm,22' the Supreme
Court stated:
[a] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria,
including:
(i) the gravity of the offense and harshness of the
penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdictions; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.222
Courts in Arizona and Ohio have applied the Solem analysis to
their states' sex offender statutes and have held that registration
2' See, e.g., People v. Adams, 555 N.E.2d 761 (111. App. Ct. 1990), affd, 581 N.E.2d 637
(I1. 1991); Ward, 869 P.2d 1062; State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134 (Ariz. 1990).
2 18 JuliaA. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension To The
War On Crime, 28 GA. L. REv. 729, 746 (1994).
219 See Doe v. Poritz 662 A.2d at 405 (holding that "[blecause the challenged provisions
do not constitute punishment, they do not violate any constitutional prohibition against
punishment").
220 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
221 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
222 Id. at 292.
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requirements do not violate the Eighth Amendment. 23 However, it is
not clear whetherSolem is still the proper analysis in light of Harmelin
v. Michigan,2 where the Supreme Court seemed to reject the
proportionality analysis of Solem.225 Therefore, the proper Eighth
Amendment analysis to undertake is unclear.26 It is clear, however, that
before SORA can be held to be cruel and unusual punishment, it must
be deemed a punitive law.227
Other challengesto Megan's Law have been made where the law
is said to violate the prohibition against Bills of Attainder. 228 "A Bill of
Attainder is a legislative act that appl[ies] either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial. 229 Whether registration
and community notification laws violate this constitutional provision
will also depend on whether the law constitutes punishment. In
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,230 the
Supreme Court applied a three-part test to determine whether a statute
inflicts punishment in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause.23" ' First,
the Court looked to "whether the challenged statute falls within the
historical meaning of the legislative punishment. '23 2 Second, "whether
223 See Lammie, 793 P.2d 134, 139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Ohio v. Douglass, 586 N.E.2d
1096, 1098-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
224 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
225 Id. at 1001. The plurality agreed that "the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between the crime and the sentence." Id. Rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime. Id; see also Artway v. Attorney
Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. at 678 (quoting Justice Scalia in Harmelin,"Solem was simply
wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guaranty").
226 Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 678 (noting that "clarity is now lacking as to the proper
application of the Eighth Amendment scrutiny...
22 See Houston, supra note 218.
221 See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367; Artway, 81 F.3d at 1235.
229 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 114 (6th ed. 1990).
230 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
23 Id. at 852.
232 Id.
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the statute, 'viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes. '' '233
Finally, the Court looked to "whether the legislative record 'evinces a
congressional intent to punish. ' ' 234  Therefore if SORA is deemed
punitive, it may be challenged as violating the prohibition against Bills
of Attainder.235
The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the three-prong test of
Selective Serv. in Doe v. Poritz, and concluded Megan's Law was not
punitive. 236 In Artway, the Third Circuit applied its three-prong test to
the registration provisions of Megan's Law and concluded they were not
punitive," Since the provisionswere non-punitive, the Court held they
did not Violate the prohibition against Bills of Attainder.238
It is unclear what the proper analysis is for determining what
constitutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause as applied to
registration and community notification statutes. The Double Jeopardy
Clause "prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time
to punish criminally, for the same offense." '239 In Doe v. Poritz, the
Court held that Megan's Law did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
233 Id. (quoting Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 475-76, 478 (1977).
234 Id. at 852.
235 SelectiveServ. Sys. 468 U.S. at 852. However, this challenge was not asserted in Doe
v. Pataki. Id. The challenge asserted in Selective Service was that the retroactive notification
provisions of SORA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
Id.
236 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 405 (noting that the analysis is "virtually identical to that
underlyingthe Ex Post Facto Clause and Double Jeopardy Clause," except for the "historical
meaning of legislative punishment").
23 Artway, 81 F.3d at 1254. The Court did not apply the test to the notification
provisions because the "ex post facto, double jeopardy, bill of attainder and due process
challenges ... are not ripe." Id.
23 Id. at 1253 (stating that "the threshold question under each Clause [Ex Post Facto, Bill
of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy] is whether the registration provisions of Megan's Law
impose 'punishment' ").
239 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938)).
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since the law was not punitive.24 ° In Artway, the Third Circuit held the
registration provisions of Megan's Law did not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause since Megan's Law was not punitive under the three-
prong test that the Court articulated?4 An analysis under Ursery would
direct a court to determine whether the legislature's intent in passing
registration and notification provisions was criminal or civil, and
whether the provisions were "so punitive" that they could not
"legitimately be viewed as civil in nature." '242 In essence, this analysis
would consider the same factors considered in the expostfacto-context:
intent and effect. 43 Therefore, if SORA is deemed punitive; it may be
challenged as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
A. Right To Privacy
The United States Supreme Court has recognized certain zones
of privacy embodied in the Bill of Rights.244 In Whalen v. Roe,245 the
240 662 A.2d 367, 405-6 (1995).
24' Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267. The Court noted that while Artway's "expostfacto claim"
was his "best challenge, "the double jeopardy challenge was "[plrobably a stronger challenge
than the bill of attainder claim ... ." Id. at 1253 n. 15. The Court stated that bills of attainder
"[i]nflict punishment 'without a judicial trial."' (citation omitted) Id.
242 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142. See generally W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. at 1209,(stating
that what "[U]rsery teaches us, however, is that such considerations [common to cases
defining punishment] may not be transformed into a rigid series of hurdles which must be
surmounted, one after the other, before the legislation can survive an ex post facto or double
jeopardy challenge").
243 See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 620. In determining whether SORA
constitutespunishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court considered intent,
design, history and effect. Id.; see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263. In determining whether
Megan's Law constitutes punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court
considered actual purpose, objective purpose and effect. Id.
.
44 See Griswoldv. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting "guarantees in the Bill
of Rights," such as those in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, "[cireate zones
of privacy").
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Supreme Court acknowledged that "individual interests in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" was a privacy interest.246 In Whalen, a
New York statute required individuals taking certain prescription drugs
to provide a copy of the prescription to the state to be kept on file.247
Doctors and patients opposed the statute argued that it violated their
right to privacy"4 The Supreme Court held that privacy rights were not
infringed upon because there was no proof that unwarranted disclosures
would arise from implementing the statute.249 With regard to public
disclosure, the Court stated that disclosure of medical information was
necessary for "modern medical practice. '"25 Therefore, providing the
state with this information did not "automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy." 251
In Paul v. Davis, 252 the Supreme Court considered whether the
right to privacy included an interest in reputation.253 In Paul, the
plaintiff's name and photograph were distributed to merchants on a flyer
captioned "Active Shoplifter.' 54 However, the Supreme Court declined
to hold that reputation was a privacy interest protected by the
Constitution .255
245 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
246 Id. at 599.
247 Id. at 592. The statute, enacted in 1972, classified "potentially harmful drugs" and
required that prescriptionsfor those drugs "be prepared on an official form." Id. The form
identified the prescribing physician, patient, pharmacy, drug, and dosage, and had to be filed
with the State Health Department. Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 600-1.
250 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
251 Id.
252 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
253 Id. at 712-13 (holding that publication of respondent's record did not infringe on his
right to privacy, even though such rights were guaranteed as fundamental by the
Constitution).
254 Id. at 697.
255 Id. at 713 (stating that none of the Court's prior "substantive privacy decisions" held
that states"are prohibited from publicizing a record of an official act such as an arrest").
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It is likely that registration requirements of SORA will not be
held to violate sex offenders' privacy rights because criminal records are
publicly available to citizens in New York.256 Information that is readily
available to the public is not constitutionallyprotected.257 Therefore, the
New York's Sex Offender Registration provisions may not be
invalidated as an invasion of privacy.
Community notification presents other legal problems.
Opponents argue mere access to information is different from public
dissemination of information, the latter being more intrusive.25 8 The
information obtained from sex offenders in New York includes: name,
address, driver's license number, photo, fingerprints and a description of
the offense. 259  This information is to remain on file with law
enforcement officials. 2 6°  Community notification is deemed more
intrusive because a greater portion of the community will obtain the
information rather than a few individuals who may actually take the time
to go to the courthouse and conduct a search. 6 Proponents respond by
suggesting that even if the information regarding sex offenders was not
disseminated to the public, concerned citizens would be able to obtain
256 See Afrika, 168 Misc.2d at 623 (stating"criminal convictions are a matter of public
record").
257 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 407 (citing Nilson v. Lyton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th
Cir. 1995), where the Court stated that "information that is readily available to the public,
which an individual cannot expect to remain private, is not within the ambit of constitutional
protection").
258 See Jerusalem, supra note 16, at 245 (arguing that allowing someone to look up
information, such as a specific conviction, is different than allowing the evening news to
broadcast an offender's name, crime, and address).
259 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-b (McKinney 1996).
261 Id. at § 168-e.
26' Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 689 (stating that "[u]nlike previous access provisions,
registrationand public notification ensure that, rather than lying potentially dormant in the
courthouse record room, a sex offender's former mischief-whether habitual or once-
off-shall remain with him for life... ").
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it through other public records. 6 2 However, community notification263
enables information that might have been lost in a manual search to
surface with greater ease.264  Recognizing a privacy interest in
community notification, the Doe v. Poritz Court conducted a balancing
test.265 The Court weighed the privacy rights of the sex offender against
the rights of the community to know about the presence of sex offenders
so that the community can protect themselves?66 In Doe, the Court held
that public disclosure substantially outweighed the privacy rights of sex
offenders. 267 The Court emphasized that sex offenders have a limited
expectation of privacy in the information disclosed?68 Proponentswould
argue sex offenders forgo any rights once they commit these heinous
269crimes. Therefore, while some individuals may concede that sex
offenders have a right to privacy, the public's interest in protection may
weigh in favor of community notification and against the privacy
interest of sex offenders.27 °
262 See Michelle Ruess, Slain Girls'Kin Stress Value of Megan's Law, THE RECORD (New
Jersey), Jan. 18, 1995, at 3 (quoting Geoffrey Berman, a former U.S. Attorney in New York
as saying "notification would not violate [the defendant's] rights to privacy because the
information disclosed-criminal history, address, description . . .vehicle-already is
'generally available' to the public").
263 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 409-10 (citing U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) "privacy encompass[es] the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person").
264 Id. at 411 (explaining that sex offender notification laws "expose various bits of
information that, although accessible to the public, may remain obscure").
26 1 Id. at 412.
•
266 Id. at 41I.
267 Id. at 412 (stating that "[t]he state interest in protecting the safety of members of the
public from sex offenders is clear and compelling").
2681 d. at 411.
269 See Michael 0. Allen, N. Y Megan's Law Is on the Books, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 23, 1996
at 12 (quotingNew York Governor George Pataki "[flinally, we are putting the rights of our
children... ahead of the right of a convicted sex offender to a so-called right of privacy").
270 See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 412.
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V. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court must ultimately determine the
constitutional ityof sex offender registration and community notification
laws."' Some uniformity is necessary. Presently, it is difficult to
determine the constitutionalityof the New York law because the courts
in New York have arrived at different conclusions regarding the
constitutionality of SORA, and jurisdictions with similar statutes have
also been inconsistent in their conclusions. 72
Generally, courts have determinedthat registration requirements
are not punitive.273 Information provided to law enforcement agencies
is information that is available to the public.274 Registration has been
held to be a regulatory measure.275 In addition, the courts suggest that
requiring sex offenders to register with law enforcement agencies is not
considerably burdensome.276 In balancing the burden imposed on sex
offenders required to register, with public safety, the courts have
concluded the need for community protection outweighs the sex
273 See Available to Public, supra note 189, and accompanying text.
272 CompareArtway, 876 F. Supp. at 692 (holding public notification of Megan's Law to
be unconstitutional) and Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 753 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(holding that community notification statutes violate the Ex Post Facto Clause), with Doe
v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 423 (upholding constitutionality of Megan's Law) and Ward, 869
P.2d 1065 (holding community notification statutes did not violate either the United States
or Washington State Constitution).
273 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 388-89; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074; Noble, 829 P.2d at
1224.
274 Feldman, supra note 14 (stating that "Megan's Law only provides easier access to
information that is already available to the public").
275 See, e.g., Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264 (citing New York v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63
(1928)).
.
276See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 631 (noting "It]he essentially ministerial action of
registrationdoes not restrain or inhibit the sex offender's activities in any significant way");
see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1266 (noting that registration "has little impact").
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offenders' rights.277
Community notification is more controversial. Proponents argue
that notification is just one step up from registration making the
informationthat is already available, readily available.278 Critics argue
that community notification is an invasion of privacy that is more
intrusive than registration statutes alone.279 Several aspects of
community notification create the inference that it is punitive.
Community notification affects all areas of a sex offenders life,
including the ability to maintain employment.80 In addition, public
humiliation may impair rehabilitation.28 ' Therefore, even if New York
enacted the law with a regulatory purpose, namely to protect the
community from violent sex offenders, the punitive impacts of Megan's
Law may lead the Supreme Court to conclude that community
notification is unconstitutional.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the issue of retroactivity.
If SORA was not applied retroactively to past offenders, how effective
would the law be? Indeed, if the purpose of community notification is
to protect the public from violent sex offenders, SORA would be
ineffective if the community had to wait until they were victimized by
sex offenders, before becoming informed of their whereabouts.282
Without retroactive application, community awareness of sex offenders
277 See id. (arguing that "proponents of Megan's Law have met the burden of
demonstratingthat its benefits, in terms of practical and concrete results, easily outweigh its
rare harms").
27 See Feldman, supra note 14, and accompanying text.
279 See Silva, supra note 208, at 1961 (arguing that notification statutes encourage
"vigilante mentality" against sex offenders and this makes it difficult for them to live a
normal life and seek employment).
28
°Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265.
281 See Jerusalem, supra note 16, at 253.
282 See Don Van Natta, Jr., Law Tracking Offenders Faces Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1996, at [hereinafter "Setback"] (quoting Governor Pataki as saying "[t]he retroactive
provisionsthe court enjoined are critical to protecting our children"); Alden, supra note 190,
at I (quoting Ms. Morrison, Assistant Attorney General, "[wjithout retroactive application
... the law would 'serve little purpose.").
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would be greatly decreased since the law would not apply to all sex
offenders already incarcerated before the law was enacted.283 However,
the United States Constitution provides that no state shall pass Ex Post
Facto laws. Therefore, if the law is considered punitive it cannot be
applied to sex offenders who committed their crimes before the law was
enacted. As discussed, courts have ,taken different views regarding
retroactive application of sex offender notification statutes.2 .4 Based on
the interpretations of the variousjurisdictions applying the Kennedytest,
it seems that if the United States Supreme Court adopts the Kennedy test
as the proper analysis for determining whether a law constitutes
punishment, then community notification will be deemed punitive.285 If
community notification is punishment, then it violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Even under the analysis used by the Doe v. Poritz Court," 6
notification provisions should be considered punitive because although
the intent is regulatory, namely to protecting the community from sex
offenders, the effect is punitive.28 7 In Doe v. Pataki, the district court
articulated an alternative test and held retroactive application of SORA's
community notification provisions unconstitutional. The decision has
been appealed.28 Sponsors of the New York law are confident that the
law will be held constitutional?8 9 In People v. Afrika, a New York state
283 Id.
284 See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 631 (holding retroactive application of
SORA's notification provisions unconstitutional); Afrika, 168 Misc.2d at 626 (holding
SORA's notification provisions unconstitutional).
285 See, e.g., Artway, 876 F.Supp. at 692 (holding the Kennedy test to weigh in favor of
finding notification punitive); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1224 (suggesting that notification
provisions have punitive effects). But see Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1068-74 (Wash. 1995)
(applying the Kennedy test and finding the sex offender statute non-punitive).
286 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404.
287 Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 701 (noting that although there were legitimate regulatory
purposes for public notification, the effect was to punish).
288 Alden, supra note 190.
289 Setback, supra note 282. Assemblyman Daniel L. Feldman and Senator Dean G.
Skelos were co-sponsors of SORA and are confident that it will pass constitutional muster.
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court held retroactive application of both registration and notification
provisions of SORA constitutional. However, it is likely the federal
view will prevail. 9° Therefore, if community notification is deemed
punitive by the Supreme Court, retroactive application of the New York
law will .violate the Ex Post Facto clause, rendering the law
unconstitutional. If New York repeals this provision, SORA may be
challenged on other constitutional grounds.
Josephine Sacco
290 See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 631 (holding retroactive application of SORA's
community notificationprovisions unconstitutional); Artway, 876 F.Supp. at 692 (holding
that the public notificationprovisions were unconstitutionalin their retroactive application);
Weston, 898 F.Supp. at 753 (determining that the statute at issue violated the prohibition
against ex post facto laws because it was a criminal penalty, applied retroactively, that
disadvantagol the offender affected by it); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F.Supp. at 1380 (granting
a preliminary injunction where plaintiff would likely be successful in proving that a statutory
provision authorizing the public dissemination of information relating to the conviction of
sex offenders violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution).

